The bioethical framework of procedural ethics is based on a principle led form of reductive and deductive reasoning which lacks social salience and does not relate to the exigencies of research in real world settings[9, 22,
Issues arise because good and innovative qualitative research cannot be squeezed within the constricting frame of bioethics c. By its nature, qualitative research is flexible, emergent and negotiated: the direction of enquiry and even the research question cannot be precisely anticipated in advance, and may alter in response to emerging findings[16, 18,
Formalism In Ethics And Non-formal Ethics Of Values Pdf Download -
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There are two dominant traditions within this field, one associatedwith the phenomenological tradition initiated by Edmund Husserl, theother closely allied with work in the analytic philosophy of mind.This entry will cover both traditions. Its aim is not to survey thedifferent moral theories proposed in the two traditions, but rather toprovide an account of the methodologies involved in moralphenomenology, to illustrate how these methodologies are applied inthe discussion of various types of moral experience, and to suggestways in which the results of these analyses address questions inmetaethics and normative ethics.
Notice two things about this taxonomy. First, these categories ofmoral experience are porous, as indicated in what we have noted aboutthe possible involvement of moral judgment in experiencing moralemotions. Moral deliberation most often includes moral judgments thatone may or may not bring to mind in mulling over some moral issue toreach a verdict about that issue. Second, as indicated in the remarksabout moral judgment, there are more fine-grained distinctions onemight draw within and across the basic types of moral experience wehave just presented (e.g., direct vs. removed moral judgments) thatmay be of phenomenological significance. The above taxonomy representsonly a rough guide to the most general types of moral experience. In section 3 and 4, we return to the work that has been done investigating some of thesespecies of moral experience as it bears on issues in metaethics andnormative ethics.
In twentieth century analytic metaethics it was long accepted thatmoral properties cannot be perceived, even if they are instantiated inactions, persons, institutions, and other items of moral evaluation.Thus, we find W. D. Ross remarking:
Each of these basic notions corresponds to a branch of any completeethical theory: theory of right conduct (or obligation), theory ofvalue, and theory of moral worth (or virtue). A common way todistinguish different ethical theories by their structure is in termsof which of these three notions (and corresponding theories) is mostbasic in relation to a theory of right conduct. Consequentialisttheories explain right conduct in terms of the value of consequencesassociated with an action or with rules for action guidance; theyrepresent value-based theories (see the entry on consequentialism). Deontological theories are united in rejecting consequentialism and,for instance, appealing to respect for persons as a basis forexplaining right conduct (see the entry on deontology). Virtue ethical theories take considerations of virtue (e.g., theactivities of a virtuous agent) as a basis for explaining rightconduct (see the entry on virtue ethics). Because virtue ethical theories of obligation have emerged relativelyrecently, twentieth century debates in ethical theory were dominatedby debates between consequentialists (sometimes referred to asteleological theories) and deontologists. How might phenomenologicalinquiry be brought to bear on the dispute between these two types oftheory?
Arendt, Hannah Beauvoir, Simone de consequentialism constructivism: in metaethics ethics: deontological ethics: virtue existentialism Hartmann, Nicolai Heidegger, Martin Husserl, Edmund introspection Levinas, Emmanuel Marcel, Gabriel (-Honoré) Meinong, Alexius Merleau-Ponty, Maurice metaethics moral realism perception: the contents of phenomenology: of the Munich and Göttingen Circles Reinach, Adolf Ricoeur, Paul Sartre, Jean-Paul Scheler, Max self-knowledge Stein, Edith
A fundamental aspect of Scheler's phenomenology is the extension of the realm of the a priori to include not only formal propositions, but material ones as well. Kant's identification of the a priori with the formal was a "fundamental error" which is the basis of his ethical formalism. Furthermore, Kant erroneously identified the realm of the non-formal (material) with sensible or empirical content. The heart of Scheler's criticism of Kant is within his theory of values. Values are given a priori, and are "feelable" phenomena. The intentional feeling of love discloses values insofar as love opens a person evermore to beings-of-value (Wertsein).
Scheler argued that most of the older ethical systems (Kantian formalism, theonomic ethics, nietzscheanism, hedonism, consequentialism, and platonism, for example) fall into axiological error by emphasizing one value-rank to the exclusion of the others. A novel aspect of Scheler's ethics is the importance of the "kairos" or call of the hour. Moral rules cannot guide the person to make ethical choices in difficult, existential life-choices. For Scheler, the very capacity to obey rules is rooted in the basic moral tenor of the person.
In this article I deal with ethics and the Internet rather than morality and the Internet. 1 I understand ethics to be principles regulating cooperative benefits and burdens. Morality includes principles justified by religious or cultural beliefs which are usually shared only by groups with restricted membership. I will first outline ethical principles applying to individuals, then societies, then global social and economic ethical principles. This ethical preliminary is necessary because I believe the principles necessary for dealing with the ethical problems of the Internet are largely based on individual and social principles, although they differ in some important respects.
When we apply the Difference Principle and consider the Internet usage of the least-advantaged, we need to consider both the impact of their own usage as well as the indirect effects of increased productivity on their prospects. Even the less well-off benefit from efficiency brought about by the Internet even if they themselves do not use it. But from the point of view of the principles of justice, increased Internet skills for the less- advantaged are not valuable just for their own sake. Increased skills must contribute either to the first principle of justice by implementing fair equality of opportunity, or to the second principle of justice by improving the prospects of the least-advantaged. Although it is very likely that increased Internet skills for the less-advantaged work to fulfill both principles, ethics and justice require us to maintain the proper focus in this area.
Two frameworks that pay particular attention to LHS infrastructures and activities are the frameworks of Psek et al. [30] and Lessard et al. [13]. Psek et al. [30] describe the framework used within Geisinger Health System, which comprises nine components, as follows: data and analytics, people and partnerships, patient and family engagement, ethics and oversight, evaluation and methodology, funding, organisation, prioritisation, and deliverables. For their part, Lessard et al. [13] recently proposed an LHS architectural framework, or high-level blueprint, intended to guide health system actors in decisions about the design and implementation of context-adapted LHSs. Their framework comprises six decision layers that reflect common LHS dimensions identified in the literature, namely (1) the performance layer (e.g. strategic goals pursued by the LHS), (2) the scientific layer (e.g. the learning cycles and activities undertaken in the LHS), (3) the organisational layer (e.g. governance models and organisational structures), (4) the data layer (e.g. the ways data is collected, used and shared), (5) the information technology (IT) layer (e.g. the IT systems in place), and (6) the ethics and security layer (e.g. the ethical and privacy measures adopted). In addition to these more global frameworks are efforts to conceptualise specific infrastructures within the LHS, notably its technological structures [31,32,33,34,35,36].
In Canada, recent reports have drawn attention to the LHS as a foundation for a higher performing healthcare system [19,20,21]. Still, there are many challenges that must be overcome to achieve this vision, notably at the level of LHS pillars. For example, Canada has made massive investments in its data infrastructure over the past decade, including substantial efforts to support EHR system adoption in primary care, yet this infrastructure remains plagued by problems of interoperability and the inability to link and aggregate data [21, 110,111,112]. Efforts to build national clinical registries or EHR-based research networks have also been slowed due to the multitude of provincial laws governing personal health information and their interpretation by ethics review boards [113, 114]. National funding for health research is not yet adapted to support rapid innovation cycles and only scant funding has been directed to change management and the scale and spread of innovations [71, 115]. Few mechanisms have been introduced to ensure strong patient involvement in health system design and priority-setting and the routine collection of patient-reported outcome measures and patient-reported experience measures is far from a reality in most health jurisdictions [21, 116]. With an inadequate socio-technical architecture, provincial health systems have been largely unable to establish a culture of learning and improvement and make progress towards the objectives of the quadruple aim [19, 21, 117, 118].
In his first chapter Rosenthal sets out the history of two oppositional strands of ethical philosophy in the nineteenth century: utilitarianism and intuitionist or internalist moral sense. The latter suggests that we have an innate faculty allowing us to perceive whether something is "good" or "bad," while the former situates the recognition of "goodness" or "badness" outside of individuals in the causation-based principles of utility, or the greatest happiness for the greatest number. He explores the writings of thinkers such as William Whewell, Adam Sedgwick, and H. L. Mansel, better known in Victorian studies for his invective against sensation fiction, and highlights the ways in which intuitionism functions "best in situations in which people have a set of shared values or conventions" (21). This mode of thinking assumes a sense of community even while concerned with private and internal moral instincts; like the act of reading itself, it is both private and implicitly dependent on a wider situatedness in the public sphere. To further unpack the fundamental research questions, the chapter uses examples from Elizabeth Gaskell's Mary Barton (1848) and Charles Dickens' Hard Times (1854). He asks us to re-think the frequent critical assumption that these novels critique utilitarian thinking without actually offering an alternative by demonstrating how they shift away from sympathy "to a more internally founded ethics" (24). Readers of both novels, Rosenthal argues, share in the "formal desire to see a false accusation removed" (28) from Jem Wilson in Mary Barton and Stephen Blackpool in Hard Times. This formal desire cannot be disentangled from the ethical drive to see a wrong righted; thus, the novels "make the reader feel the internal, and sensible, existence of morality." (30) 2ff7e9595c
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